
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
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Approved For Release 2008/03/20 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000400530001-1 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Council 31 August 1983 g/Q NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa Attached is a short speculative paper on Chad that Harry Rowen asked us to do. It has been circulated to selected members of our intelligence and policymaking "constituency" in the hope that it offers insights into what we believe is a problem that will take some time to sort out, possibly in ways that do not fit the goals that the US is seeking. I hat's a very croughtfur I well rounded pièce on Chad Congratulationis - WfC

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#### IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHAD SITUATION

#### Introduction

Now that the French have intervened in force, the conflict in Chad is entering a new phase that is likely to prove particularly vexing to US policymakers. Given the relative balance between the opposing forces in Chad, the most likely scenario is for a protracted stand-off during which the French and the Libyans try to work out an agreement that leaves the country temporarily partitioned, provides for the pull-back of some of the foreign forces and leaves for later a political solution within the context of the OAU or-less likely--under international auspices.

A much less likely scenario is a dramatic escalation of the fighting, resulting in a decisive victory for the Libyan-backed Goukouni forces.\* Such a development could be set into motion by a serious military miscalculation on the part of the French or, more likely, by a quixotic counteroffensive by Habre, against the advice and without the support of the French.

Even under the best of situations, Chad will be a long-term problem for US policymakers for several reasons. First, short of a sound military defeat at the hands of the French or a major loss of political control at home, Qadhafi will not give up his goal of ousting Habre and installing a regime in N'Djamena that will accede to his claim to the Aouzou Strip and permit him the use of eastern Chad as a springboard for subversion into Sudan. Second, Chad's history of civil war and failed alliances strongly suggests that there is virtually no chance of a lasting reconciliation between Habre and Goukouni. A government of national unity led by those men would only become a new arena in their long-standing power struggle. A Habre government in N'Djamena will be a continuing target for subversion by Qadhafi and whatever Chadian dissidents he can muster. Third, France and the US have different interests in Chad and different perceptions of the role of Western military power in that country. Finally, the Africans (and to a lesser extent the Arabs) are divided over Chad and unlikely to be of much assistance either individually or collectively through the OAU in furthering US objectives regarding Chad.

\* Obviously a Habre/French victory would be a positive solution from a US standpoint and thus is not discussed in this paper.

| This memorandum was prepared by  | the National Intelligence    |  |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Council's Analytic Group under the auspices of   | f the Acting National        |  |
| Intelligence Officer for Africa and the Nation   | val Intelligence Officer for |  |
| Near East and South Asia. It was coordinated within the National Intelligence Council. |                              |  |

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| A Protracted Stand-Off  |               |
| Over the short term, neither Qadhafi nor Goukouni will feel bound by a cease-fire agreement or the outcome of any political negotiations that appear to be going against Goukouni's quest for international legitimacy as presiden of Chad. Qadhafi will try to make the most of the limited success he has achieved in northern Chad by strengthening Goukouni's military posture and by portraying Libya's role as an attempt to help a rightful ruler regain his capital against neo-colonialist intervention.   | τ             |
| If the current crisis ends in a de facto partition of Chad, the Africans will welcome the respite but will do all they can to ensure that the partitio does not become permanent. All Africans agree to the inviolability of national boundaries but not all agree on the question of who should govern Chad. Although last year's OAU summit recognized Habre as Chad's legitimate leader, the present conflict has prompted enough African governments to reconsider their positions that efforts at an African solution through the OA could become protracted and rancorous. OAU chairman Mengistu already has slanted his approach to the problem in favor of Goukouni and Qadhafi and will be a serious impediment to an African consensus. Thus, the Chad question could become as intractable and as long-running as the Western Sahara problem | on<br>AU      |
| Most Arab states will be pleased by any outcome in Chad that leaves Qadhafi frustrated and Habre in power. The Sudanese, who rightly feel most threatened by Libya, will hope that any step up in Libyan aid to dissidents opposed to President Nimeiri will be postponed by Qadhafi's need to focus resources on Chad. Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be pleased by the belated French intervention and may credit the US for encouraging it. The Maghreb states, which Qadhafi is currently courting, will also be privately pleased to see him bogged down in Chad. Only Syria and possibly South Yemen will back Libya actively in diplomatic maneuvers over Chad and neither will offer any meaningful military support.  | to            |

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
If Goukouni were to gain control of Chad, the problems of restoring order and subduing local warlords, perhaps including a rebellious Habre as well, would require a Libyan occupation force for some time. The financial, logistical, and manpower demands would be formidable and might limit somewhat Qadhafi's capabilities to cause trouble elsewhere. Qadhafi probably would not wait for Goukouni to become firmly established before turning his attentions elsewhere, however.

Qadhafi certainly will be tempted to renew his efforts to destabilize Sudan at an early stage. With a dependent Goukouni in N'Djamena, his access to eastern Chad would be improved. Some of Goukouni's forces are Sudanese dissidents trained in Libya for the express purpose of subverting Nimeiri. The Sudanese inhabitants of Darfur province, adjoining Chad, have long been neglected by Khartoum. Their grievances could readily be exploited by Libyantrained agents and armed bands from Chad at a time when Nimeiri is beset by internal problems.

Considering the weakness of the Sudanese military, the vast distances in Sudan and the lack of modern infrastructure or military access facilities in western Sudan, a Chadian-based insurgency will be difficult to counter. It is virtually certain that in such circumstances Nimeiri will make impassioned appeals for US help in addition to whatever assistance Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who would both be concerned over the projection of Libyan power into Sudan,

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# Annex

# A Chadian Chronology

| Late Nineteenth and<br>Early Twentieth Centuries | France conquers the area; political and economic power is centered in the south, based on new cotton farming.   |
|--|---|
| 1960   | Formal independence, with the north remaining under French military control.  |
| 1964   | France withdraws from the north.  |
| 1966   | Frolinat, a northern-based liberation movement, is formed to resist repressive measures by President Tombalbaye.  |
| 1968   | France sends in air force units against Frolinat, under 1964 defense agreement.   |
| 1969   | France sends in 1,600 man ground force.   |
| 1971   | Libya recognizes Frolinat.  |
| 1972   | Libyan-French agreement, by which Libya ends support of Frolinat.   |
| 1973   | Tombalbaye agrees to Libyan "annexation" of Aozou Strip of northern Chad.   |
| 1975   | Tobalbaye killed in a coup; General Malloum seeks reconciliation with Frolinat.   |
| 1976   | Frolinat splits between pro-Western Habre and nationalist Goukouni; Chad and France sign a military agreement.  |
| 1978   | Habre joins Malloum in the government; Habre and Goukouni are reconciled and Frolinat advances on N'Djamena; France sends 2,500 troops to support the government. |
| 1979   | Habre, Malloum and Goukouni are reconciled, but split; OAU names Goukouni as transitional president.  |
| 1980   | Habre-Goukouni civil war; Goukouni calls in Libyan troops; Libya-Chad merger announced.   |
| 1981   | Libyans withdraw and OAU sends in peacekeeping force.   |

### SECRET A-1

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1982

Habre, backed by Egypt and Sudan, advances on N'Djamena; OAU force takes no action; France at first backs Goukouni; Habre chases Goukouni out of N'Djamena, and is recognized by OAU as President.

1983

Border clashes between Nigeria and Chad in April - June Goukouni advances into Chad from the north with Libyan backing. Zaire sends troops to support Habre. France sends military equipment, and eventually, troops and planes.

